July 28th 2010 – this day four years ago - was when the historic SKS IPO opened. It was a stupendous success and it set the bench mark for Indian MFIs aspiring to enter the capital market. However, the architect of India’s only microfinance IPO was however unceremoniously removed in October 2010. M. Rajsekhar and M. Anand (The Economic Times) highlighted these governance concerns in an article, which, in my opinion, changed the course of Indian microfinance in 2010, which had already plunged into a deep crisis because of previous happenings:
“It just doesn’t add up. This May, the board of directors of SKS Microfinance gave CEO Suresh Gurumani a 50%-plus increment, hiking his annual compensation from Rs. 1.5 crore to over Rs. 2.3 crore. It also awarded him a Rs. 80 lakh cash bonus. Three months after that, Mr Gurumani helped complete a spectacularly successful IPO, the first by a microfinance institution (MFI) in India and the second the world over, fulfilling a key mandate the board had given him when he was hired in December 2008. The stock listed at a market cap of Rs. 8,000 crore, exceeding most analyst expectations. And yet, within two months of what was a landmark listing for India’s microfinance sector, the board fired Mr Gurumani. No official explanation was offered by the company, though CFO Dilli Raj, in a conference call with analysts, ruled out any financial irregularity. Many directors, all speaking on the condition of anonymity, chorus a one-line explanation for the termination—non-performance. ET interviewed over a dozen sources close to both Mr. Akula and Mr. Gurumani—investors, directors, current and former employees, bankers and regulators. Sources on Mr. Akula’s side paint this as a difference in business strategy. Those close to Mr. Gurumani say this was a personality clash, a power struggle. They point to Mr. Akula’s changing roles in the company as evidence.… Still, questions on the SKS board’s U-turn—giving a 50%-plus hike to the CEO and then firing him five months after that—refuse to go away.”
Thus, the popular perception of microfinance had hit a low, and much of the good work done by many stakeholders, including some MFIs, was beginning to be viewed suspiciously. How did microfinance, once regarded a noble profession, come to be viewed this way? To what extent did the change in the microfinance paradigm (to hardcore commercialization) cause this negative perception? What led to the now famous AP 2010 microfinance crisis? What happened in AP in 2010 and before? Who was responsible for the state of affairs that led to the AP crisis in the first place? What specific and generic lessons can be learned from the crisis going forward, both for Indian and global microfinance?
These and other questions started to flit across my mind and I decided to pen my thoughts as a book - An Idea Which Went Wrong: Commercial Microfinance in India, which will be available from August 22nd 2014 at www.amazon.com and through several other global and Indian outlets.
I state things as I saw them unfold over the past few years, backed by relevant data wherever available, taking off from a little before the Krishna district crisis of 2005–2006 in AP. Even before that, I narrate the story of Zaheera Bhee and her daily struggle for survival amidst severe poverty and adversity, to provide the readers with an overall context of (enthusiastic) financial inclusion that preceded the 2010 AP crisis. This is followed by a description of the antecedents to the 2010 AP crisis. I thereafter attempt to seamlessly weave in various happenings during this crisis with my own field-based analyses, before outlining the various lessons gleaned thereon with specific examples from the Indian microfinance sector, backed by solid evidence, data and facts where available!
The book is organized as follows: Part I, which includes chapters 1-2, sets the overall context for the book; Part II, comprising Chapters 3–11, looks at the antecedents to the 2010 crisis and takes the reader through the various happenings during the crisis and brings them up to date with events as of December 2013; Part III, which incorporates Chapters 12–34, offers critical issues and lessons for global and commercial microfinance, as discerned from the 2010 and previous microfinance crisis situations in India, with regard to a number of specific topics-ranging from corporate governance to risk management, compensation, MIS, internal controls, microfinance agents and staff, client acquisition, effective interest rates, nonbanking financial company (NBFC) regulation and supervision, priority sector lending (PSL), self-regulation, code of conduct, and the like. This part also houses two important chapters – one for redeeming the Indian microfinance industry and another for reforming the agenda for global microfinance and the CGAP; and Part IV, concludes with a critical chapter - Chapter 35, which is the epilogue that focuses on the crucial aspect of making the RBI more accountable to the people of India, especially in the light of the 2010 AP microfinance crisis and recent events that occurred in the financial inclusion space. Part V is an appendix containing data, tables, exhibits, and other relevant material including references and glossary.
To reiterate, my sole objective in bringing out the aforementioned book is to ensure that the key lessons from the 2010 AP crisis and events thereafter are not lost for global and Indian microfinance. Other countries especially would not want to go through what India and specifically AP have gone through in terms of financially excluding millions of poor clients (who were once financially included) just because of a distorted growth process that had been adopted by the MFIs (then)
It is my humble opinion that the evidence, facts and examples provided in the book will serve to educate various stakeholders including microfinance practitioners, regulators, governments, investors, bankers, academics and several others
I hope you enjoy the book
Ramesh S Arunachalam
Source: Quoted from “More to SKS script than meets the eye” by M. Rajshekhar and M. Anand, The Economic Times, October 8, 2010.